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KOFI OTENG KUFUOR*

New Institutional Economics and the
Failure of Sustainable Forestry in
Ghana
ABSTRACT
This article explores reasonsfor the failure of sustainableforestry
in Ghana. Its contribution to the debate examines the problem of
increased timber logging from an institutionalistpoint of view.
Drawing on New Institutional Economics methodologies, the
article sets out hitherto unexamined rationalesfor the failure to
reverse deforestation in Ghana. The focus is on key actors and
institutions in the timber market and the state bureaucracy. The
article challenges the assumption that legislation on sustainable
forestry is motivated solely by the public interest. The article
concludes by suggesting a raft of approaches to dealing with
deforestationin Ghana.
INTRODUCTION
Deforestation in Ghana has resulted in the reduction in total
forest cover from 8.2 million hectares at the turn of the twentieth century
to 1.6 million hectares in 2003.1 The majority of Ghanaians rely on forests
for cooking and firewood; 2 thus, deforestation threatens their
livelihoods. Also, timber is Ghana's third most important export and,
thus, depleted forests have serious implications for national economic
3
development.
Amidst concern for environmental
conservation
and
management, the Ghanaian Parliament passed the Timber Resources
*
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1. George Kyei Frimpong, Ghana Likely to Lose ForestCover Under 20 Years, GHANAIAN
CHRON., Aug. 26, 2003, available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/News
Archive/artikel.php?ID=41906 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
2.

AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DATABASE

CASE STUDIES-

GHANA FOREST Loss § A.2.c, available at http://www.american.edu/TED/ghana.htm (last
visited Aug. 28, 2004).
3. Id. § A.2.
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Management Act (TRMA) in 19974 as one of several measures designed
to reverse deforestation.- Despite this legislation, deforestation continues
to be a major problem in Ghana. Ostensibly public interest legislation,
the TRMA was designed to conserve forests by regulating and excluding
the timber operations of certain economic actors, who were allegedly
responsible for rapid forest loss. Under the TRMA, timber operators can
only harvest trees if they follow these new regulations. Yet, the TRMA
has been ineffective and deforestation is still a serious problem.
How do we explain the failure of the TRMA to combat
deforestation? In the opinion of Ghanaian policy makers, the failure is
due to the continuing illegal and unsustainable practices of the chainsaw
operators 6 and the inability of government departments to enforce the
TRMA. 7 Government officials have consistently argued that chainsaw
operators continue to break the law by felling trees and converting them
to lumber.8 However, I argue that this interpretation is too simplistic.
This article uses New Institutional Economics (NIE) methodologies to
suggest an alternate explanation, to gain more insight, and hopefully to
solve the problem of deforestation in Ghana.
Using NIE methodologies, this article suggests that policy
makers must recognize that the timber millers were a major force behind
the TRMA. Beneath the TRMA's "public interest" veneer was an alliance
of interests-a coalition between rent-seeking timber millers and
national environmental bureaucrats. Although environmental concerns
were voiced during the adoption of the TRMA, its real motivation was
the protection of entrenched private interests. The TRMA succeeded in
protecting those private interests but failed to protect the public interest
in reducing deforestation. Because NIE excels at illuminating how
private interests affect policy, this article uses NIE to examine the

4. Timber Management Resources Act, 1997 (Act 547) (Ghana) [hereinafter TMRA].
For a discussion of the Act, see Kofi Oteng Kufuor, ForestManagement in Ghana: Towards a
SustainableApproach, 44 J. AFR. L. 52 (2000).
5. For an argument that deforestation in Ghana is grossly exaggerated, see JAMES
FAIRHEAD & MELISSA LEACH, REFRAMING DEFORESTATION: GLOBAL ANALYSES AND LOCAL
REALITIES: STUDIES IN WEST AFRICA ch. 4 (1998).

6. For recent allegations that chainsaw operators are responsible for rapid
deforestation, see Samuel Owusu-Ansah, Illegal Chain Sawn Lumber Accounts for More Than
Half, ONLINE INDEP., Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.independent-gh.com/story.asp?
id=658 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
7. See Simmons Yussif Kewura, FSD Accuses Police Over Illegal Forest Operations,
GHANAIAN CHRON., June 25, 2003 (noting collusion between police units and chain saw
operators); Illegal Logging.info, Illegal Logging in Ghana's Asubima Forest, at http://www.
illegal-logging.info/news.php?newsld=112 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
8. Owusu-Ansah, supra note 6.
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TRMA's failure and to suggest alternate policy solutions to the
deforestation of Ghana.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the participants
in the Ghana timber market and the TRMA's salient provisions. Part II
examines the public interest theory of legislation and how it has been
used to justify the TRMA. Part II also suggests that public decision
makers are motivated by their material interest in a manner akin to
private decision makers. The focus here is on approaches to
understanding human behaviour that are subsumed under NIE and, in
this regard, I rely on rational choice theory, public choice theory, and
rent seeking.
Part III analyzes how the Ghanaian sawn lumber market worked
before entry by the chainsaw operators and shows how the timber
millers were the main beneficiaries of this arrangement. Part III also
explains how the chainsaw operators upset the contractual relations that
bound market participants together. My hypothesis in part III is that
unrestrained chainsaw operators ruptured existing contractual relations
within the market for sawn lumber. That rupture led to pressure by the
timber millers for the regulation of the chainsaw operators and their later
expulsion from the sawn lumber market altogether. In part III, I also
analyse how the activities of chainsaw operators threatened the interests
of public sector decision makers, thus prompting the latter to forge a
rent-seeking alliance with the timber millers.
Part IV, suggests institutional and legislative changes that can
help tackle deforestation in Ghana. Part V concludes the paper.
I. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE GHANA SAWN LUMBER MARKET
Before the entry of the chainsaw operators into the timber
market, there were three groups of market participants. Logging firms
were responsible for primary production, i.e., felling trees. Timber
millers carried out secondary production, e.g., sawmilling, plymilling,
and veneer milling. Furniture workers performed tertiary production,
e.g., manufacturing furniture parts, doors, and windows. Some firms had
achieved full vertical integration; others had integrated the secondary
and tertiary sectors. 9 In addition to these market participants, the Ghana
Timber Association, the Ghana Timber Millers Organization, and the
Furniture and Woodworkers Association of Ghana and Small-Scale

9. See FOSUABA A. MENSAH BANAHENE, GHANA'S TIMBER INDUSTRY: PERSPECrTWES OF
THE PROCESSING SEC7OR 5-6 (1997).
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Carpenters Association represent the primary, secondary, and tertiary
sectors, respectively. 10
Intra-industry contractual relations favoured the timber millers.
The custom in the contractual process was that the loggers were obliged
to transport their logs to lumber mills for inspection. Transporting logs
to the mills represented an estimated 31.82 percent of variable costs that
12
loggers incurred" and was the largest portion of the loggers' total costs.
The loggers were required to offload their logs while the millers
examined the product. In the (invariable) event of a low price being
offered by the millers, 13 the loggers would seem free to on-load the logs
and seek a new purchaser.' 4 But things were not so simple.
Millers routinely cooperate on prices offered to loggers for their
products, 15 giving them market power and making it unlikely that the
logger will get a better price elsewhere. Furthermore, while millers allow
their cranes to be used for offloading, they do not allow the logger to
immediately use the same crane to on-load the logs if the logger wishes
to seek a better bargain elsewhere.' 6 These practices made it virtually
impossible for loggers to seek better prices.
The chainsaw operators disrupted this status quo. Chainsaw
operations tend to be very small outfits -usually consisting of only two
persons.' 7 They cut timber and use chainsaws to saw the logs into
lumber. Highly mobile, not subject to the control of the national timber
bureaucracy, and capable of evading tax obligations, chainsaw operators
have much lower production costs than loggers and millers. 18 These
lower costs enabled chainsaw operators to capture profits from the
timber millers in several ways.
First, they converted felled logs into lumber, thus competing
directly with the millers. 19 Second, they competed for the millers'
10.

Id.

11.
See THORSTEN TREUE, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF TROPICAL
MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA 102, tbl. 10.2 (2001).

HIGH FOREST

12. Id.
13. On the low prices for logs offered by the timber millers, see Distressed Timber
Companies to Receive Permits, AFRICAST.COM, Aug. 18, 2001, at http://www.africast.com/
archivetest.php?showStart=200&strRegion=West (last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (noting the
Ghana Timber Association's concern about the low prices offered to them for their timber
by the timber millers).
14. Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, Forest Services Division, in Kumasi,
Ghana (Sept. 29, 2002).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

Summer 20041

SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY IN GHANA

suppliers by offering loggers better prices than the millers. Thus, the
loggers were increasingly inclined to deal with the chainsaw operators
because they could strike a more profitable bargain. 20 As a result, the
timber millers now faced the distinct probability, through the loss of
their market power, of going out of business altogether. 21 My hypothesis
is that it was this threat to the millers' livelihoods that resulted in their
lobbying for the TRMA. 22 This supposition is tested in part III below.
An Overview of the Timber Resources Management Act
Prior to the TRMA, to harvest timber in Ghana, an application
for a timber concession had to be made to the Chief Conservator of
Forests and, subject to a recommendation by a District or Regional
Forestry Officer, a firm or individual was granted a timber concession. 23
In the view of policy makers, this practice had two consequences: it
lacked transparency in the award of concessions and it also resulted in
unrestricted logging by timber entrepreneurs who had no incentive to
practice sustainable forestry. 24 In response, the Ghana Parliament passed
the TRMA 25 and the Timber Resources Management Regulations 26 (the
Regulations) to prohibit harvesting timber without a Timber Utilization
Contract (TUC).27 It was argued that TUCs "would allow the [timber]
contractor sufficient contract duration so as to improve his security of
tenure, to provide him with sufficient incentive to plan and execute
prescribed operations for efficient resource utilization, thereby
20. Id.
21. Id. The millers' plight was compounded by the difficulties involved in vertical
integration of timber firms. This is largely due to the high costs involved in the start up of
time operations. See also BANAHENE, supra note 9, at 5-12; TREUE, supranote 11.
22. Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, supra note 14.
23. 17 Parl. Deb., Ghana (4th Ser.) (16 Dec. 1997) Col. 2062.
24. Id.
25. TRMA, supranote 4, art. 1.
26. Timber Resources Management Regulations, 1998 (L.I. 1649) (Ghana) [hereinafter
TRM Regs.].
27. Timber Utilization Contracts (TUCs) are essentially ecological contracts. Ecological
contracts are institutional arrangements designed to regulate relationships between users
of a natural resource and parties affected by such use. Ecological contracts are normally
drawn up between private parties rather than between the state and the exploiter of a
natural resource. As market-oriented environmental instruments, TUCs set out contractual
terms between the parties with the aim of producing an environmentally efficient use of
natural resources. Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Environmental Contracts-A Lesson in Democracy
from the Japanese, 25 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 361, 375 (1991). For further research into
ecological contracts, see Eckhard Rehbinder, Ecological Contracts: Agreements Between
Polluters and Local Communities, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 147-65 (Gunther Teubner

et al. eds., 1994).
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2
enhancing the possibility for sustainable management." 8 One
consequence of the TUCs was that only their holders could enter the
forests and harvest timber. 29
Under the TRMA, holders of a TUC are also under an obligation
30
to submit proposals on "a reforestation or afforestation plan for the
establishment and management of forest plantations of at least 10
31
hectares for each square kilometre of the contract area." Failure to
manage the TUC area in a sustainable manner is ground for its
suspension or termination. 32 To advance the public interest further, the
TRMA also imposes social obligations on the holders of TUCs.
Applicants for an award of a TUC are to submit a Social Responsibility
Agreement (SRA) to the Timber Rights Evaluation Committee (TREC).
An SRA assists inhabitants within the contract area with such amenities
as shall be specified in the agreement at a cost of not more than five
33
percent of the annual royalty accruing from the operations of the TUC.
34
In addition, under the TRMA, companies and partnerships
35
registered in Ghana can harvest timber subject to compliance with
37
procedures of the Forestry Commission 36 and the TREC, the grant of
38
timber rights by the Minister for Lands and Forestry, and ratification by
Parliament. 39 When granted a TUC, the holder is required 41to execute a
4°
reforestation plan and to promptly pay rents and royalties.
Chainsaw operators and their activities were subject to the terms
of the Regulations. Before a chainsaw operator could fell trees, he had to
43
apply to the district assembly 42 for registration and a licence. Chainsaw
44
operators were required to register with the district forest office.

28. Timber Resources Management Bill, 1997 (second reading) (Ghana) 5 (on file with
author).
29. See TRMA, supra note 4, art. 1.
30. Afforestation is the planting of trees on land that has not borne forests for a period
of time, usually decades or centuries. Alexander Mather, Introduction, in AFFORESTATION
POLICIES PLANNING AND PROGRESS 2 (Alexander Mather ed., 1993).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. II.13(1)(a). A hectare is 100 square metres.
TRMA, supranote 4, art. 15(1)(a).
TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. II.13(1)(a).
TRMA, supranote 4, art. 2.
Id.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 5-6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 8.
Id.
District assemblies are units of local government in Ghana.
TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. VI.28(1).
Id. pt. VI.29(1).
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Chainsaw operators were expressly forbidden to convert felled trees into
45
lumber for sale.
The reasoning offered for TRMA was to protect the environment
and to curtail deforestation. Since the law was so ineffective, it is
reasonable to question the rationale supporting the law and to seek more
fundamental explanations for its failure.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST, PRIVATE INTERESTS, AND THE
TRMA
Perspectives on the regulation of industry by the state differ
between those who see legislation and regulation as being in the public
interest and those who argue that legislation and regulation tend to
benefit well-organized private interests. 46
Explaining TRMA under Public Interest Theory
The essence of public interest theory is that legislation and
administrative action are the consequence of decisions by public officials
who have overall social welfare at heart.47 Public officials are the best
persons to execute public-interest policies because, given their
experience with the public policy process, they have the cognitive ability
to ascertain what decisions will maximize overall social welfare. 48 As
applied to environmental law and policy, public interest theory assumes
that environmental public goods will be provided through legislation
and administrative regulations because law and policy makers respond
to the pressure and lobbying of their constituencies and civic environ49
mental groups.

45. Id. pt. VI.32(1).
46. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3
(1971).
47. Public interest theory traces its roots to the work of A.C. Pigou. A.C. PIGOU,
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 329-35 (4th ed. 1932). For a more recent exposition, see Steven P.
Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000). For its application to
environmental law, see PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (David

Robinson & John Dunkley eds., 1995).
48. To observers of legislation and bureaucracy in Ghana, state regulation of timber
markets is not surprising. This is because after independence there was a growth of public
interest legislation. ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: PROBLEM-SOLVING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD

WORLD 220 (1994).
49. See Daniel Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
59, 64-65 (1992).
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The public interest underpinnings of the TRMA were as follows:
First, it was alleged that the chainsaw operators were a major cause of
deforestation and environmental degradation.5 This was because they
tended to fell trees that had not matured, in effect undermining the
51
government's reforestation and afforestation efforts. For this reason,
the Regulations prohibited timber harvesting unless a special permit had
been obtained for this purpose. The permits enabled official scrutiny of
52
Despite this public interest
the chainsaw operators' activities.
effective regulation in several
produce
to
failed
foundation, the TRMA
ways.
permit requirements.
First, chainsaw operators have disregarded
53
illegally.
timber
harvest
to
They have continued
Second, the TRMA did not adequately consider the ramifications
of the small size of chainsaw operators. That small size meant that
chainsaw operators did not have the financial means to embark on
reforestation programmes, leading them to engage in unsustainable
timber practices. 54 For the same reason, their small size makes them
highly mobile outfits capable of exploiting forests in any part of Ghana at
a moment's notice.55 Thus, their small size makes them difficult to
control and allows them to evade taxes on their activities and to deny the
treasury much needed income5 6
Third, the chainsaw operators' on-the-spot conversion of trees
had serious consequences for deforestation. Using chainsaws converts
less than 20 percent of a felled log into lumber. In contrast, timber millers
57
convert 30 to 35 percent of their logs to lumber. Thus, the chainsaw
operations led to cutting at least twice the volume of timber to produce
8
the same amount of lumber as a timber miller5 This led to increased
deforestation.
Fourth, under the TRMA the Minister is empowered to compel
59
holders of TUCs to supply the domestic market with timber products.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, supra note 14.
Id.
TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. VI.40(1).
Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.

57. TROPENBOS INTERNATIONAL-GHANA: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION, CHAINSAW
LUMBER PRODUCTION: A NECESSARY EVIL? 7, 10 (2003), available at http://www.tropenbos.

nl/docs/finalreportchainsawlumber.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (suggesting that conversion rates are less than 20 percent but citing a different source that believes conversion
rates may be higher).
58. Id.
59. TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. VI.36.
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This provision was designed to ensure a regular supply of good quality
sawn lumber to the domestic market. The argument was that the millers
tended to concentrate many of their logs on the export market. As a
consequence, most of their products sold locally were neither first nor
second grade sawn lumber. This adversely affected the domestic market
because the chainsaw operators exploited this shortage in supply but,
given their crude conversion process, they fed the local market with
inferior sawn lumber. The consequence was the increased demand for
new (and hopefully better quality) lumber, which resulted in increased
exploitation of forests by the chainsaw operators.
In hindsight, TRMA was remarkably ineffective at addressing
the real problems behind deforestation. That raises the question whether
environmental protection was the real motivation behind the law or
whether some other motivation was at work.
New Institutional Economics (NIE) is well suited to answer this
question. NIE incorporates a theory of institutions and human behaviour
into economics. NIE does not aim to challenge and overturn neo-classical
economic theory, 60 and it does not attack and overturn methodological
individualism, 61 the basis of neoclassical economics. 62 Instead, it modifies
neoclassical economic theory by abandoning assumptions of instrumental rationality. 63 While neoclassical economics assumes a world free of
institutions,64 NIE sees institutions as crucial to determining policy
outcomes. In departing from instrumental rationality and articulating the
importance of institutions, NIE draws on insights from economics,
political science, law sociology, anthropology, and organization theory to
60.

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT

1 (Econ. Dep't of Wash. Univ., Working Paper No. 9309002, 1993), available at http://
econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
61. Methodological individualism is the assertion that the social sciences should be
studied from the viewpoint of individuals. In effect, individuals make decisions, not
groups such as "parties, provinces or nations." James M. Buchanan, Politics Without
Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 11, 13 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984).
62. Traditional neoclassical economics assumes that individuals are rational decision
makers. There are some "ambiguities" in the definition of rationality though. See Viktor J.
Vanberg, The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, Its Deficiency and Its
Evolutionary Alternative, 11 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 1, 1-29 (2004). But see Anton D.
Lowenberg, Neoclassical Economics as a Theory of Politics and Institutions, 9 CATO J. 619, 61939 (1990) (arguing that Institutionalism and other challenges to neoclassical economics are
"fallacious" because neoclassical economics has rapidly "expanded its empirical content
and explanatory power" by bringing aspects of collective and institutional choice into the
domain of economic theory).
63.

NORTH, supranote 60, at 1.

64. Id. This is because neoclassical economic theory assumes that institutions are not
necessary and both political and economic markets are perfect.
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understand the origins, framework, success or failure, and the
development of institutions. 65 However, NIE concedes the importance of
methodological individualism as a means of understanding decision
66
making.
In exploring motivations for particular decisions by individuals,
NIE encompasses a broad range of theories that explain social, economic,
and political institutions.67 Stigler posits that market forces provide
strong incentives for lawmakers to enact laws that serve private interests
rather than the public interest. 68 Thus, well-organized interests in society
lobby lawmakers and bureaucrats so as to secure legislation that is
favourable to them. 69 The process of lobbying is referred to in the NIE
literature as rent seeking. 70
Rent seeking is defined as the socially costly pursuit of wealth
transfers.71 Industry engages in rent seeking from the government in a
number of ways. 72 For example, seeking state mandated control over
65.

For an introduction to NIE, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL

CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); and ERIK G. FuRUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER,
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (1997). For its application to the study of the environment, see SEN WANG &
CORNELIUS G. VAN KOOTEN, FORESTRY AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AN
APPLICATION OF CONTRACT THEORY TO FOREST SILVICULTURAL MANAGEMENT (2001); and

JOUNI

PAAVOLA

& W. NEIL ADGER,

NEW

INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS

AND THE

ENVIRONMENT: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Centre for Social

and Economic Research on the Global Environment, Working Paper No. EDM 02-06 2002),
available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/publications/wp/edm/edm02_O6.pdf (last
visited Aug. 27, 2004).
66. This is one of the major contrasts between NIE and the so-called Old Institutional
Economics. For an introduction to Old Institutional Economics, see JOHN R. COMMONS,
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934).

67. Originally applied to the work of transaction cost and property rights analysis, NIE
has now been extended to Public Choice theory, economic history, the law and economics
movement, and non-market social relationships. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST SCHOOLS, at http://www.cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/new
inst.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004). Under the broad rubric of NIE is George Stigler's
influential paper on regulation. Stigler, supra note 46. See also Sam Peltzman, Towards a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).
68. Stigler, supra note 46.
69. For an elaboration on how this is done, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).

70. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291, 291-303 (1974); GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993); GORDON TULLOCK, THE
ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989); Gordon Tullock, Rents and
Rent Seeking, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING 51 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988).

71. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807,
807-27 (1975).
72. Stigler, supra note 46, at 4.
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entry into an industry by new rivals is a form of rent seeking. Such
restrictions would either prohibit new entry outright or impose higher
costs on new entrants,73 thus enhancing profitability for existing
participants. Thus, the conventional NIE assumption is that when an
industry has enough political power to exploi, national policy-making
institutions, it will use this power to prevent the entry of rivals into a
given market.
NIE encompasses Public Choice theory. 74 Proponents of Public
Choice theory argue that, contrary to popular assumptions, public
officials rarely act in the public interest. Instead, they are motivated by
their own personal, usually economic and financial, goals. In effect,
private interests drive public policy. 75 As we shall see below, the TRMA
can be interpreted as the outcome of collusion between timber millers
and national environmental bureaucrats in a manner well explained by
NIE and Public Choice theories.
NIE has been applied to environmental decision making and
outcomes 76 using Rational Choice theory, a variant of NIE. Both Rational
Choice and NIE theories suggest that individuals try to make the most
efficient decisions possible in an environment of scarce resources. In
their rational pursuit of efficiency, humans become "utility maximizers"
bent on securing the greatest benefit to themselves relative to the costs

73. Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 313, 348-50 (1998).
74. For the relationship between NIE and Public Choice theory, see HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT, supra note 67.
75. Public Choice Theory is the study of "the complex exchange process that we call
an economy." It applies tools and methods used to study market decision making to nonmarket settings such as bureaucracies. Buchanan, supra note 61, at 12-13. See also WILLIAM
A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1994); PATRICK McNuTr, THE
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE (2d ed. 2002). For a challenge to Public Choice, see LARS
UDEHN, THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC CHOICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC

THEORY OF POLITICS (1996); DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE:
WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT (1995); and Mark Kelman, On DemocracyBashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
76. See Jonathan Baert Weiner, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999); Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, InternationalLaw, and Future
Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 (1998); Paul L.
Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy:
The U.S. Acid Rain Program,41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998). For a critique of the flaws of applying
Public Choice theory to environmental policy, see DAVID TOKE, GREEN POLITICS AND NEOLIBERALISM (2000); and John O'Neill, Public Choice, Institutional Economics, Environmental
Goods, 4 ENvTL. POL. 197 (1995).
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they incur. Rational Choice is thus an instrumental theory of human
77
behaviour that seeks to interpret and explain human decision making.
Garett Hardin's analysis of unrestrained decision makers is an
example of how Rational Choice theory can be used to understand
environmental degradation. 78 Hardin asserts that it is rational for
herdsmen using a common grazing area to engage in unrestrained
grazing up until the point when the common grazing area is depleted
and thus of no further economic value. In this process, wider society
bears the costs of the rational man. This is because the consequences of
his rational calculations are shifted outward to society at large in the
79
form of unusable grazing land.
We must note here, however, that some scholars argue that there
are flaws in Rational Choice theory. The essence of this criticism is that it
does not fully explain human motivations-i.e., not all individual
decisions are determined by a narrow perception of self-interest. Civic
obligations, commitment, and the desire to do what is right all serve to
80
shape individual decision making.
Hardin's herdsmen on their common grazing area are analogous
to chainsaw operators working in Ghana's forests. As such, NIE may
provide useful insights into the practical realities underlying the failure
of the TRMA and lead us to more effective policies.

77.

For an introduction to Rational Choice theory, see HANNU NURMI, RATIONAL

BEHAVIOUR AND THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND MODELS (1998);
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOUR (1976); and RATIONAL

CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986). For the application of Rational Choice methodologies to law
in general and environmental law in particular, see Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the
Economic Analysis of the Law, 19 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 487 (1994); Christine Jolls et al., A
BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); and ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990). For a critique of Rational Choice theory, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(1994); and EMILY HAUPTMANN, PUrrING CHOICE BEFORE DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1996).
78. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
79. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice
Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 133 (1989).
80. With specific reference to environmental decision making, see Joseph P. Kalt &
Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV.

279 (1984); Debra J. Salazar & Robert G. Lee, Natural Resource Policy Analysis and Rational
Choice Theory: A Strategy for Empirical Research, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283 (1990); David B.
Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in
EnvironmentalLaw, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2001); and Farber, supra note 49.
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III. NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE MARKET FOR
SAWN LUMBER IN GHANA
NIE leads us to examine the human interactions and institutions
to explain policies. When the chainsaw operators entered the Ghana
sawn timber market, they disrupted the status quo in which the timber
millers exerted market control over the loggers. How did TRMA respond
to this?
First, the Regulations ban chainsaw operators from converting
logs into lumber. 81 The Regulations therefore eliminate the millers' rivals
in the lumber market. This forces the loggers to contract with the millers
and so restores the balance of power in the market that was upset by the
activities of the chainsaw operators. Although, some chainsaw operators
still illegally fell and convert timber into lumber, loggers now have to
resume contractual relations with the timber millers.
Second, logging firms must agree to a Social Responsibility
Agreement (SRA) with the local community before timber can be
harvested. On its face, this is a public interest provision because it seeks
to compensate local communities for exploiting their natural resources.
However, the practical effect of this is to co-opt the local communities
into the rent-seeking coalition by motivating them to prevent chainsaw
operators and the loggers entering into arrangements to illegally fell,
buy, and sell logs. Any illegal felling of logs denies the local
communities lucrative rents. Thus, while the TRMA as a whole provided
a framework for local communities to benefit from the "rents of nature,"
it also permitted the timber millers to rein in the loggers and prevent
them from seeking more profitable prices from chainsaw operators.
Third, the TRMA also generated revenue for the national
environmental bureaucrats, thus satisfying their self-interest. Regulated
loggers pay stumpage fees 82 to the Administrator of Stool Lands 83 and
the Forestry Department. 84 The Chief Conservator of Forests, the
Administrator of Stool Lands, and the Forestry Commission are
responsible for calculating stumpage rates. 85 Under the Regulations, a
stumpage fee is to be paid by the holder of a TUC. 86 The holder of a TUC

81. TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. VI.32(1).
82. Stumpage fees are "royalties to the landowner and charges for the cost of felled
timber which provide a basic return to the landowner and contribute[] to the cost of forest
management and timber regulation." Id. pt. V.21(2).
83. Id. pt. V.25(3).
84. Id. pt. 26(1), (2).
85. Id. pt. V.26(3).
86. Id. pt. V 21(1).
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87
is also to pay rent to the Administrator of Stool Lands for his TUC area.
Stumpage fees provide a basic return to the landowner and also pay for
8
the cost of forest management and timber regulation.
The ability to tax the immobile loggers has greatly enhanced the
89
revenue accruing to the Forest Services Division. Furthermore, with the
re-establishment of the millers' control of the market for sawn lumber
and the low prices they offer to the loggers for their timber, the TRMA
has led timber loggers to increase their activities in order to recoup costs.
While this increase in their activities results in greater volume of
stumpage fees, it also aggravates deforestation.
Thus, a range of state officials benefit from increased logging.
The importance of this is reinforced by the decision to transform the
Forestry Department into a semi-autonomous and self-financing
organization. Thus, fees from timber activities are crucial to its survival.
Because chainsaw operators tend to avoid their financial obligations, it
was in the interest of the Forestry Department to exclude them from the
market for sawn lumber and to re-establish the pre-existing market
equilibrium.
Examining the TRMA from an NIE perspective reveals why it
failed. The TRMA failed at the most basic level -it failed to prevent
deforestation- whether from chainsaw operators or loggers. NIE
explains this failure by positing that the true rationale for the law was to
protect timber mill owners -which it did successfully. But timber mill
owners had no incentive to reduce deforestation. Indeed, more logging
activity lowers the price that mills pay for logs, thus increasing the mills'
profits. This example illustrates how NIE reveals institutional incentives
and suggests that these insights would have value if applied prior to
developing new policies.

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
DEFORESTATION IN GHANA
While it is easy to see the failure of the TRMA and to wish for
different results, it is harder to suggest solutions. How should we
regulate the harvesting of timber in Ghana's forests? A number of
solutions could be proposed.

87.
88.
89.

TRM Regs., supra note 26, pt. V.27.
Id. pt. V.21(2).
Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, supra note 14.
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Do Nothing
Concern about Ghana's forests has persisted since the colonial
era.90 There is a longstanding view that Ghana's forests are under threat
from unsustainable logging. But doing nothing suggests faith in market
forces to correct any ecological disequilibrium brought about by overlogging. This argument is known as the exclusionist view of
environmental resources. 91 It assumes unlimited environmental
resources and directs decision makers to exclude concerns about the
impact of their activities on the environment. 92 Advocates of the
exclusionist thesis also posit that firms will adopt voluntary
environmental restraints for a number of reasons. Environmental selfregulation may be seen as a strategic move by firms when they realize
that previously ignorant and unorganized consumers are now beginning
to value a cleaner environment. That new value increases the probability
of more stringent government regulation. To avoid that, firms will
proactively adopt environmental measures. 93 Thus, the exclusionist
thesis could justify the do-nothing approach because policy makers
could argue that over time timber firms and chainsaw operators would
become more aware of the need to conserve forests and will do so
voluntarily.
Privatization
A second option available to Ghanaian policy makers is the
privatization of forests. Private property in environmental resources is
designed to change the behaviour of firms that seek to exploit the
commons. Property rights in natural resources promote economic
90.

See, e.g., GOLD COAST COLONY, REPORT ON THE FORESTRY DEPARTMENT FOR THE

YEAR 1945-46, at 5 (1946) (noting that human over-exploitation of the forests in the Gold
Coast (now Ghana) is the first of a chain of events that would culminate in complete
deforestation). See also FARHEAD & LEACH, supra note 5, at 60 (noting over-exaggeration of
deforestation in Ghana). This "do nothing" approach has gained some currency in
academia. The thrust of this contention is that either the problem is over-exaggerated or
markets will correct any environmental imbalances caused by human activity. This
argument is implicit in the works of scholars such as Julian Morris and Jacquline Kasun.
JULIAN MORRIS & ERNEST H. PREEG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND DEGRADATION:
PRESSURE GROUPS, FOREIGN AID AND THE MYTH OF MAN-MADE DESERTS (1995); Jacqueline
R. Kasun, Doomsday Every Day: Sustainable Economics, Sustainable Tyranny, 4 INDEP. REV. 91
(1999).
91. GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 23-24
(2nd ed. 1996). This view is thus highly critical of sustainable development.
92. Id.
93. John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of
CorporateEnvironmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583 (2000).
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efficiency in resource utilization. 94 Private property in the commons will
95
create an incentive for timber firms to internalise any externalities.
Private property enthusiasts argue that over-exploitation of the
commons is a consequence of the absence of private property rights. In
effect, privatization would guarantee responsible timber operations, as
firms would have an incentive to protect their own natural resource.
Applied to Ghana's forests, this would mean assigning ownership of the
96
productive forests to individual companies.
Recent developments indicate that a gradual evolution is
occurring toward a private property regime over Ghana's forests. In the
opinion of some observers, this privatization of the forests is the last
97
stage in the evolution of the rights to the commons. The privatization
process begins when there is a scarcity of a particular natural resource.
As demand for a scarce resource increases, parties with a direct interest
in the exploitation of the resource begin to lobby for the transformation
of the existing property regime from a public regime to a private regime
with well-defined property rights.98 That appears to be happening in
Ghana's timber market.
Deforestation is resulting in the scarcity of timber. Parties with a
direct interest (the timber millers) are lobbying for regulation of their
competitors (protecting their access to the resource). The government has
decided to regulate the market. These are the features that characterize a
99
move towards privatization of natural resources.
Private rights over natural resources can evolve when the state
initiates measures such as the allocation of allowances or it intervenes in
economic relationships. 100 We have seen this in the TRMA provision that
allocates TUCs and excludes chainsaw operators. The next step could be

94. R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a
Common Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & Econ. 679 (2000).
95. Externalities are the negative consequences of any economic undertaking that are
not borne by the individual engaged in such activity. Internalizing externalities then means
making the individual bear the full "social cost" of his economic activity. A good example
is that of the "polluter-pays" principle. For a general discussion of externalities, see Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347,347-59 (1967).
96. See BANAHENE, supra note 9, at 28 (arguing in support of private property over the
commons as this would guarantee companies long-term access to their raw materials).
97. See Bruce Yandle, Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global
Commons, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 13, 28-30 (1999).
98. See Demsetz, supranote 95, at 356.
99. See Yandle, supra note 97, at 30.
100. Id. at 31. Another means by which private rights to the commons can emerge is
when there are no organized lobbies keen to secure the grant of property rights through
state legislative or administrative action. In such an instance, the rights over the commons
evolve gradually. Id. at 30.
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when competing interest groups (chainsaw operators and timber millers)
express an overriding demand for private rights, and the previously
regulated property becomes private property. Arguably, this process
might be taking place already in Ghana. Given the special interests that
lobbied for the TRMA,10' the continued illegal activity of the chainsaw
operators, and the acknowledgement by the state that it does not have
the power to halt their activities, it is possible that we could end up with
a wholly private property regime.
Paying Chainsaw Operators Not to Log
Preventing deforestation could also be done through policy
makers and/or the timber millers paying the chainsaw operators to exit
the market altogether. This is because the persistence of chainsaw
operators in the timber market can be explained by the failure of the
rent-seeking coalition (the timber millers and environmental
bureaucrats) to offer sufficient compensation to them. Paying the
chainsaw operators to leave the timber market is an illustration of the
arguments by Ronald Coase in his seminal work on decision making. 102
The Coasean analysis shows that when certain costs103 are zero, parties
can reach an agreement to allocate rights and liabilities to promote
efficient outcomes. Coase's analysis has been applied to environmental
policy and problems and has led to the conclusion that bargaining
between parties can produce environmentally efficient outcomes. 104
However, the problem with applying the Coase Theorem to
compensating chainsaw operators for their losses would be how to
prevent the illegal entry or re-entry into the market by new or old
chainsaw operators.

101. Interview with Regional Forestry Officer, supra note 14.
102. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
103. These include transaction costs, the costs associated with discovering the relevant
prices, the costs of negotiating and concluding contracts, and the costs of making long-term
contracts. Id. Other definitions of transaction costs exist. Thrainn Eggerston sees transaction
costs as the costs that arise when individuals exchange ownership rights to economic assets
and enforce their exclusive rights. THRAINN EGGERSTON, ECONOMIc BEHAVIOR AND
INSTITrrTIONS 14-15 (1990); Yoram Barzel defines transaction costs as the costs associated
with the transfer, capture, and protection of rights. YORAM BARZEL, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2d ed. 1997).

104. See Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources and Biotechnological Change, 35
J.L. & ECON. 199 (1992); Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Cosean Bargaining in
Collaborative Environmental Policy, in THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

(Anthony Heyes ed., 2001); Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient
Markets: Lessonsfrom Los Angeles Smog Control,38 J.L. & ECON. 19 (1995).
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Regulating Contracts Between Millers and Loggers
Another approach could be for the state to intervene in the
contracts between the loggers and the millers. As noted above, in the
present arrangement, the loggers have no recourse to alternate buyers of
their logs at favourable prices. This is a consequence of collusion on
prices between the timber millers, made possible by the lack of an
antitrust law in Ghana. State regulation of timber contracts could require
millers to inspect timber before it is felled and to give an enforceable
guarantee that they will purchase it upon delivery. Failure to do so could
subject the millers to a civil action for damages. This will probably be
sufficient incentive for the millers to abide by the terms of an agreement
they enter into at the point of inspection.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the TRMA using NIE concepts suggests that the
TRMA was at least partly driven by private interests keen to secure their
own pecuniary advantages. The role that public interest (environmental)
arguments played was that they provided the necessary cover for the
rent-seeking coalition. The rent-seeking coalition was successful because
it argued that the TRMA was environmental legislation instead of a
private wealth-enhancing statute. The coalition did this by skilfully
manipulating the political transaction costs that came in the wake of the
TRMA.
Political transaction costs are those costs to obtain information
10 5
about the benefits or costs of statutes or administrative regulations.
Political transaction costs tend to be high for unorganised consumers and
other individuals but tend to be low for organizations. This creates
opportunities for rent-seeking coalitions to secure favourable legislation
by offering a public interest explanation for private interest legislation.
NIE theory reveals how rent seeking, public choice, and rational choice
explain the outcomes in the TRMA. This article also suggests that TRMA
came to be presented as public interest legislation through the
manipulation of political, social, and environmental information.

105. Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355
(1990).

